Annalisa Coliva - - Philosophical Quarterly 58 — Oxford University Press. The Paradox of Moore's Proof Of. Annalisa Coliva - unknown. Sosa's Moore and the New Dogmatists. Susana Nuccetelli - - Metaphilosophy 40 2 How to Reid Moore. John Greco - - Philosophical Quarterly 52 Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans.
Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press. Charles Landesman - - Journal of Philosophical Research Added to PP index Total views 61 , of 2,, Recent downloads 6 months 4 , of 2,, How can I increase my downloads? He says that his argument would be accepted as a good argument in normal, everyday circumstances. Besides the question of whether the external world exists now , philosophers are interested in whether it existed in the past as well.
But, Moore claims, proofs similar to the one above would show the past existence of an external world. The proofs will resemble the proofs of things existing now, but they will also have important differences. One such proof could be: You remember that a few minutes ago I held up one hand, and then the other, therefore, two hands existed in the past.
They want something more than this, but it can be difficult to know exactly what else they want. But he can know that he is holding up his hands, without being able to prove it. Proof of an External World study guide contains a biography of G. Moore, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.
Remember me. Annalisa Coliva. Download PDF. A short summary of this paper. Just Begging the Question. In the first section I will present Moore's original proof and claim that, despite Moore's intentions, it can be read as an anti-sceptical proof.
In the following two sections I will present Wright's and Pryor's interpretations of it. Finally, I will claim that if we grant some of Pryor's intui- tions, it is true that the proof does not exhibit what Wright calls "transmission-failure" and Pryor misleadingly presents as a case of question-begging argument.
I will then offer my own interpretation of what a question-begging argu- ment is. On that basis, I will claim that, contrary to what Pryor maintains, Moore's proof is not just wanting because of a generic dialectical shortcoming, but because it begs the question after all.
Moore's Proof: Moore Moore's proof is often presented without mentioning the actual context in which it was first produced, and it is almost always presented as an anti-sceptical proof.
The dialectical setting which is usually taken for granted features two characters: a sceptic about the existence of the external world and Moore himself in his capacity of common sense philosopher, par excellence. As a matter of fact, however, things are not that straightforward. For "Proof of an External World" is a long essay con- sisting of two parts. In the first and more substantial part Moore takes his lead from Kant's famous complaint that it is still a scandal to philosophy that nobody has proved that the external world exists.
He then introduces a number of distinctions which should clarify the meaning of the expres- sion "external world" and he concludes that in order to prove that the external world exists, one should prove that there are things that can be encountered in space and that exist independently of our minds. He then moves on to the proof. By holding his hand in front of him, so that he and his audience can see it, Moore says: 1 "Here's one hand"; then he hides it.
Then, following the same procedure, he says: 2 "Here is another"; then he hides it. Finally, without showing his hands again, he concludes: 3 "There are two human hands at present". Since the conclusion concerns the existence of objects which can be encountered in space, despite the fact that they are not currently perceived, and that, therefore, exist independently of our minds, Moore claims that 3 entails: 4 "The external world exists". Notice that so far Moore's proof is only a proof against an Idealist who claimed that it is not the case that there is an external world, for he would claim that objects do not exist independently of our minds.
Such an Idealist could presumably concede the truth of the premises, although I doubt that he would concede 3 and, therefore, the conclusion of the argument.
However, nothing has been done so far to show that the premises are known - as opposed to be presumed by both Moore and the Idealist - to be true and that, therefore, the conclusion is likewise known to be the case. Hence, Moore's proof, so far, can't be taken to have any bearing against scepticism.
In effect, a few years later, responding to his critics Moore , Moore himself claimed that his proof was meant to be against the Idealist and not against the sceptic.
For he was aware of the fact that in order to read it as a proof against scepticism he should have proved that he knew his premises. In particular, he should have proved that he was not dreaming. But Moore candidly admitted that he could not prove that he was not dreaming, for all his evidence would have been compatible with the fact that he was dreaming.
The interesting question then is this: Why is it that almost all the readers have taken Moore's proof to be an anti-sceptical proof? And, moreover, did they have the right to do so, given Moore's claims about his proof? After producing his proof, Moore goes on to say that his proof is a rigorous one because: i the premises are different from the conclusion; ii the conclusion really follows from the premises and iii he knows his premises with certainty to be true.
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